Ozu’s most endearing characteristic, for me, is what Sato calls his "pillow shots." The term comes from the "pillow words" used in Japanese poetry – words that may not advance or even refer to the subject, but are used for their own sake and beauty, as a sort of punctuation. In Ozu, a sequence will end and then, before the next begins, there will be a shot of a tree, or a cloud, or a smokestack, or a passing train, or a teapot, or a street corner. It is simply a way of looking away, and regaining composure before looking back again. (via)

Ozu’s use of "pillow shots," which unobtrusively break up the action and give the viewer a moment to contemplate or rest. The "pillow shots" consist of flowers or banners or whatnot … (via)

Much has been made of Ozu’s visual devices: the camera pitched to the eye level of an ideal spectator watching from the comfort of a tatami mat; the compositions that emphasize the geometric qualities of the Japanese interior, with its clean lines, right angles and frames within frames; the "pillow shots," as Ozu called them, of wind-rustled trees, passing trains, empty side streets, that provide buffers of silence and reflection between dramatic scenes. (via)

Ozu also developed a curious form of transition, which various critics have labeled "pillow shots" or "curtain shots." Between scenes, he would always place carefully framed shots of the surroundings to signal changes in setting, as well as for less obvious reasons. Basically a hybrid of the cutaway and placing shots, these transitions were considered unusual for extended length; they sometimes seem motivated more by graphic composition and pacing than by the demands of the narrative. (via)

Materialism of the Other

In enjoyment, Levinas explains, and as I attempted to unfold previously, the ego is produced as the result of an involution of the cosmic womb of the elements. Living from the various media or milieus of the elemental – on light, air, water and food – the ego is able to maintain itself over time, although it is always exposed to the uncertainty implicit in its dependency on what lies outside of it. The fruit may wither on the vine, the river dry up – the ego can never be sure of its future. Fortunately, there opens the phenomenon that Levinas calls dwelling – through the setting up of an ‘extraterritoriality’ set back from the immediacy of elemental life. The ego continues to join what it receives from the element, but is now able to deepen a movement of interiorisation, consolidating its independent identity. Such a movement comes together, in dwelling, with a movement of labour and acquisition, Levinas argues; dwelling is the node wherein the ego sets itself back from the world in a home, even as it maintains an opening to the element. But dwelling cannot be reduced to the phenomenon of the possession of a home – it expresses, rather, that position which allows the capacity to possess. A capacity that, Levinas argues in some obscure and troubling pages, is dependent on an act of welcoming.

The ego can come to dwell in the home because it is made welcome there, says Levinas, by a feminine other – to ‘the gentleness or the warmth of intimacy’. Like the goddess Hestia, who remains in the hearth, the feminine extends an invitation to the ego into the privacy of dwelling, in the interior space that will become a home and permit of inhabitation. Compared to the ‘timeless and carefree’ paradise of enjoyment (although always menaced by the ‘concern for the morrow’), we find instead ‘a perpetual postponement of the expiration in which life risks foundering’. Levinas argues the ‘very dimension of time’ opens in dwelling, through that act of welcoming that separates the ego from the immediacy of the element. The welcome of the feminine permits a collection and consolidation of egoic existence. The dimension of labour, which in turn allows the ego to possess the items it brings into the home, is dependent upon the initial invitation the femininely coded space of intimacy extends to the ego.

Levinas tells us such intimacy is not to be confused with the actual physical presence of a woman. Femininity would simply provide an appropriate metaphor for a private space. Nevertheless, this is not an innocent metaphor, but confirms a whole history of thought wherein the feminine is made to stand for a ground that absents itself in order to allow the existence of a self which is always coded as masculine. Levinas, to be sure, wants to break with ideas of a nourishing, maternal sense of the earth, of the primordial matrix at the source of the world in pagan cosmogonies. The cosmic womb of the element that Levinas seems to reference in his account of enjoyment can easily become opaque and unnourishing matter. Levinas’s feminine is, by contrast, discreet, belonging to a hidden fold in the earth – but this merely perpetuates the cliche of a benign and self-abnegating maternal presence, enabling others without wanting anything for itself.

But what does it enable? The welcome of intimacy grants the possibility of having time – of a deferral of the ‘concern for the morrow’ which threatened the hedonism of enjoyment. It permits labour to transform the element, letting the hand (for Levinas, the organ of work) grope towards what it can then apprehend as things. I am able to begin what he calls the ‘Odyssean journey … where the adventure pursued in the world is but an accident of a return’: what matters is the movement that consolidates the identity of the ego.

The pages on dwelling, dense and troubling are difficult enough. But no sooner than he has articulated its structure, Levinas imposes another on top of it. The ego, he argues, is exposed to the alterity of the Other [Autrui] – to that relation that is experience as the good, as responsibility at the same moment it has come to dwell. I will not rehearse Levinas’s well known account of the opening of the ethical here. But this opening – a welcoming of the Other – occurs simultaneously with the welcome that feminine intimacy bestows. From the first, the dwelling is not securely possessed by the ego, but turned towards the Other to whom the ego is engaged in responsibility. This is why Levinas can write, ‘The chosen home is the very opposite of a root. It indicates a disengagement, a wandering [errance] which has made it possible, which is not a less with respect to installation, but the surplus of the relationship with the Other, metaphysics’.

The home, then, is not the basis of subjective identity – the root it sends down into the earth – even though feminine intimacy is said to grant the possibility of an increased independence from the element. For that independence is, seemingly simultaneously, turned over to the Other who, it must be understood, cannot be identified with the intimacy with the feminine. The Other is not encountered in the home, but as coming from outside of it – the alterity of the Other is in no way the indefiniteness of the element, but the infinity of a relation that contests any attempt on the part of the ego to close itself up. Dwelling, says Levinas, is the node that joins the movement of interiorisation to the movement of labour and possession; I am able to commence an Odyssean journey. But this journey is subject to a detour from the first – I am never allowed, it seems, to journey back to myself, since the Other before me – anyone at all – disengages me from my identity and deracinates my home (I wander from my home in my home, the interior having been unfolded and exposed to the outside. In it and outside of it, the home, now, is entirely exposed, entirely open …)

‘No human or interhuman relationship can be enacted outside of an economy; no face can be approached with empty hands and closed home’. The circulation which seems to be permitted by a domestic space (Levinas calls this economy) is broken by the relation to the Other. The space into which I am welcomed becomes immediately a space of hospitality. Note that hospitality bears upon what my dwelling has allowed me to make into a possession – it is a giving of what I have wrested from the element. Hospitality has a material content. As Blanchot writes in another context, reflecting, no doubt, upon his reading of Levinas:

Materialism: ‘my own’ would perhaps be of little account, since it is appropriation or egoism; but the materialism of others – their hunger, their thirst, their desire – is the truth of materialism, its importance.

I am never allowed to tend complacently to my own hunger, my own thirst; my desires are, from this point no longer my own, since they come from without. Although I may indeed decide to follow only those desires I take to be mine, this is a movement of reaction. Appropriation and egoism have already been challenged; the hunger of the Other – his thirst, his desire – has already laid claim to me in dwelling.

Great is hungering – this phrase, which Blanchot quotes from Levinas, and which I quoted in a previous post finds another significance: great is the hungering of the Other …

Blanchot again:

If I cannot welcome the Other by answering the summons which his approach exerts to the point of exhausting me utterly, it is surely through awkward weakness alone (through the wretched ‘after all, despite everything’, and through my portion of derision and folly) that I am called upon to enter into this separate, this other relation. I am called to enter it with my selfhood gangrened and eaten away, altogether alienated (thus it is among lepers and beggars beneath the Roman ramparts that the Jews of the first centuries expected to discover the Messiah.)

The relation to the Other implicates me as I exposed in a new sense – not, now, to the uncertainty of the element, but to the infinity of a relation that separates me from the root that my home might otherwise become. It is not that my home is open to the Messiah for Blanchot (explaining Levinas), as though it were sufficient to leave a place within my dwelling for him that he might come. I myself am the Messiah who would welcome the Other in my home. I myself – and only as my egoity, my selfhood is eaten away to nearly nothing. Must I become hungry in order to feed the Other in turn? But hunger, now has a new significance. My hunger is no longer mine, it is not my first concern …

When one commentator says, The Messiah is perhaps I, he is not exalting himself. Anyone might be the Messiah – must be he, is not he. For it would be wrong to speak of the Messiah in Hegelian language – ‘the absolute intimacy of absolute exteriority’ – all the more so because the coming of the Messiah does not yet signify the end of history, the suspension of time.

It announces a time more future, as the following mysterious text conveys, than any prophesy could ever foretell: "All prophets – there is no exception – have prophesised only for the messianic time [l’epokhe?]. As for future time, what eye has seen it except Yours, Lord, who will act for him who is faithful to you and keeps waiting". (Levinas and Scholem)

The coming of the Messiah – the opening of my dwelling to the Other – belongs to the time prophesised by the prophets, Blanchot suggests (following Levinas, following Scholem): what matters is not the time I have, but that which I can now give to the Other. But this formulation gets things the wrong way round: it is the Other who brings the gift of time as it arrives from outside the closed economy of the ego. Or rather, it is the Other who gives sense to the time that dwelling has allowed me, orienting it in a particular direction.

With the Other, Levinas explains comes the condition of language, of reason – of the ability to grasp cognitively what the hand only groped towards (I do not have the space to discuss these topics here). Labour, says Levinas, is only able to shape the indefiniteness of matter, it is not able to make it renounce its anonymity. But my address to the Other, acknowledging his identity (the Other is a he, for Levinas), opens the dimension of language that allows for such a grasping. I no longer feel my way into the future, groping uncertainly; to think is to change the quality of the time that I have. But of course, my time is no longer mine; it belongs, Levinas says, to the Other – just as it must be judged according to another relation that opens in the relation to the Other.

He points here to the relation to other Others – to those alongside to the Other to whom we open our home. From the exclusivity of the ethical relation, we pass to the domain of politics, of judgement: we must now measure up carefully what we are to do and to whom we should give our time (even as, according to Levinas, time is given to us by the Other). The Messiah gives way in us to the judge who lives in a world of competing claims. I must decide what to do with the time that has been given me. And the moment I am brought before this decision – which is to say immediately, all at once – I am no longer the Messiah – or the Messiah is not the only one I am. Who am I to feed – this Other? this person standing before me? But what about the other Others – what about the ones who are genuinely starving? How am I to weigh up their demands upon me?

Great is the hungering of others in the world around me! Great is the whole burden of human suffering as it implicates me!

The demand of justice for always greater justice: in me, outside of me and in justice itself, thus also in the knowledge and exercise of justice. All of which presupposes what may be called the tragic imbroglio of the other and others; whence the intervention of the social and the political, under guarantee of the law, in the service of all that is far (first of all) and of all that is near – whence perhaps the repetition of the word peace, that this last word may be enriched by this echoing of itself in an incomparable repetition.

The long road of justice is a hard one. Like the journeying of Abraham, who departed alone, travelling towards all – from particularity to universality – under threat from the night and with all the hopes of the day.

I quote from a newly translated essay by Blanchot, ‘Peace, peace to the far and to the near’, without justifying here why his words can stand in for those of Levinas. The Messiah (who Blanchot evoked in a previous paragraph) gives way to the wanderer Abraham, perpetually en route from the ethical to the social and the political – from the particularity of the relation to the Other to the universality of the relation to the other Others. The latter, since there will always be hunger, and I can never do enough, belongs to a tragic imbroglio – a word that belongs to the other people Blanchot mentions in this essay – to the Greeks who have passed down to us ‘the logos, philosophy, beauty, and a certain idea of democracy’. Tragic because there are all too many … but hopeful, too, since there is always a surplus over the universal, over our inheritance from the Greeks: a particularity that, says Levinas, says Blanchot, lays claim to us as the ethical.

Great is Hungering

The account of the birth of the ego in Levinas’s Totality and Infinity resembles a cosmogony. It is said to originate through a relationship with a series of media or milieus – in the plenitude of a cosmic womb that bears distinct elements within it: the earth and the sea, light and warmth, but also the familiar expanses of the city. The ego, from the first, is immersed in these elements, bathing in light and warmth, and nourishing itself in a movement that sustains and consolidates its existence.

This dependency on the non-self does not belie the independence of the ego, its happiness. Need – Levinas’s term for the relation to the other, to the things which nourish the ego or bathe it in light and warmth – is not first of all a lack. ‘Enjoyment is made’, writes Levinas, ‘of the memory of its thirst; it is a quenching’; certainly, enjoyment contains a memory of privation, but this is only as a dissatisfaction that has already been answered. The ego remembers a withdrawal from sustenance such that its plenitude can be experienced; lack appears only in the realisation of its appeasement, and it is inferred rather than experienced.

It is in this act of remembering – this enjoyment of enjoyment, which has always fulfilled a need – that the ego comes to itself in its independence. To live on or from the series of elemental media – to relish the taste of fruit, the coolness of the river, the familiar vistas of the street – ‘delineates independence itself, the independence of enjoyment and happiness’. For Levinas, the ego is given in a ‘contraction of sensation, the pole of a spiral in which the trajectory of turns and involutions is inscribed in joy’ that is itself enjoyed.

With this claim – and his whole account of enjoyment – Levinas seeks to break from what he sees as the intellectualist bias of phenomenology. The ego is given in its ipseity through a contraction of sensation – no ideal self needs to be understood as the basis of this involution. And likewise, Levinas insists, we do not first of all represent what we enjoy to ourselves, ascribing value to something already represented, but conversely; it is upon the non-objectifying acts of breathing, eating and drinking that we live from, and whose value is no way separable from the immediacy in which they are given. Intentional consciousness, understood to constitute its objects, rests upon a prior act of positing – of the achievement of an embodiment that serves as the basis for consciousness.

Just such an autoaffective positing takes place within the sights, sounds and sensations – qualities apparently without support (the ego is not concerned from whence they come, but only that they come) – in which we bathe. For Levinas, the ego emerges from the not-I, the other, but this is not accomplished once and for all. Certainly, the ego is singularised and autonomous before the appearance of consciousness, but this happy self-sufficiency has to be constantly reachieved; it depends on a movement of becoming that is the basis of the life of the ego. It depends upon the movement for which alimentation, says Levinas, expresses the essence: that which passes from the other to the same.

As such, intentional consciousness depends upon a prior, bodily intentionality – upon a series of elements whose form it cannot constitute in advance – the immediacy of light and warmth as they gratify me all at once, as well as the indeterminate milieu from which they emerge. In this way, enjoyment breaks from the subordination of the things we encounter to a ‘technical finality’ such as, he suggests, we find in Heidegger. ‘As material or gear the objects of everyday use are subordinate to enjoyment – the lighter to the cigarette one smokes, the fork to the food, the cup to the lips. Things refer to my enjoyment’. In place of a single finality, then – the for-the-sake-of-which of human existence that gives sense to the things we encounter – we find a series of finalities that are autonomous with respect to one another. Here, Levinas waxes positively Batailliean: to enjoy something is to do so ‘without utility, in pure loss, gratuitously, without referring to anything else, in pure expenditure’. Happiness is the suspension of a single finality; it belongs to ‘the disinterested joy of play’.

But what happens when food cannot be found, and the sun sinks beneath the horizon? what, when the river has dried up and the fruit on the vine withered? For the most part, the absence of immediate gratification is still to be understood as a mode of enjoyment: our distress and trouble are merely part of that movement of alimentation that provides invigoration, continued life. Sensibility is passive compared to the activity of thought – I am the mercy of the elements that provide me with light, warmth and food, but I am still confident in my ability to consume the other, transmuting it into the same. I still hold myself separate from the world, looking to absorb what I encounter into a higher unity; perhaps we find here a doubling of the constitutive activity of consciousness in the way the ego, in enjoyment, partially and provisionally constitutes the habitat which sustains it.

Pain and trouble, for the most part, belong to the rhythm of enjoyment – the uncertainty of finding nourishment does not belie the confidence that there will something, once more, to eat. In enjoyment, sensibility is given in an egoism – a monadic separation – whose essence is this confidence. Yet enjoyment is precarious; there is the threat that confidence will not be enough, and the element, far from affording sustenance and invigoration, becomes indifferent matter. Water, water everywhere and nor a drop to drink … Coleridge’s becalmed mariner knows the element only as what Levinas calls ‘an opaque density without origin, the bad infinite, or the indefinite, the aperion’.

Suffering, says Levinas, is not a state more basic than enjoyment; it is, he argues, an inversion of joy – a vulnerability to matter that is no longer an immersed, oblivious participation. One can never take for granted what is expressed by Levinas in the infinitive – to eat, to drink, to sleep, to warm oneself – since each can be prolonged into the indefinite reserve that resists the egoic movement from the other to the same. What, then, does hunger become when it is no longer part of the rhythm through which the other is measured by the same?

Remembering Antelme’s The Human Race, which relates its author’s experience in the camps, Blanchot writes,

We must meditate (but is it possible?) upon this: in the camp (as Robert Antelme said while enduring it) need sustains everything, maintaining an infinite relation to life even if it be in the most abject manner (but here it is no longer a matter of high or low) – if need consecrates life through an egoism without ego – there is also the point at which need no longer helps one to live, but is an aggression against the entire person: a torment which denudes, an obsession of the whole being whereby the being is utterly destroyed.

Blanchot goes on to evoke that ‘egoism without ego’ which reveals itself in a need for nourishment that is no longer part of the structure Levinas calls enjoyment. Need, now, has displaced itself from the ipseity of the ego, which thrives on the contents of what it ingests. In lieu of itself, enduring only as an empty craving, the ego absents itself from the autoaffection in which it was born. Or this auto-affection seems to outlive it, need become impulse, ipseity voiding itself in the mechanism of existence.

Enjoyment, now, reaches its limit. If for the most part, we are steeped in an instinctive hedonism by which life is first of all a ‘love of life’, and whose worth is given in terms of its contents as they are ‘more dear than my being’, Antelme shows us what happens when need destroys the ipseity it formerly sustained.

We live, says Levinas, from "good soup", air, light, spectacles, work, sleep etc.’ – but our dependency brings with it what we cannot possess. If I am grounded by the relation to things as they are given to me in enjoyment, I might also be uprooted by their absence. And if the carnal ego – Levinas’s rebuttal to what he sees as the separation of mind and body in phenomenology – is not yet the formal identity from which consciousness constitutes the world, it is vulnerable when the elements become indefinite, bad infinities, and lack all determination.

Sensibility, which seems to grant the life of the separated ego, may also threaten this separation. Hunger is not only a pause, a momentary rest that has the certainty of sustenance before it, but menaces the very ipseity of the I. In enjoyment, the elements withdraw as they allow individual things – this piece of fruit, this cleared patch of woodland – to be absorbed into the same. But enjoyment also vouchsafes that uncertainty Levinas calls the ‘concern for the morrow’. It describes, on the one hand, the movement from the other to the same, that maintains the ego in its independence within dependence, but on the other, threatens to let the other become indigestible and thereby undo the ipsiety of what it sustained.

Even as enjoyment is exaltation (the enjoyment of enjoyment, its doubling up in joy and gratification) it is also inhabited by uncertainty. One cannot by certain of having time to enjoy. What else is the experience of pain and suffering, for Levinas, but the absence of the prospect that seems to open to the ego in enjoyment – an immediacy that is given as the return of what detaches the present moment from any kind of future?

Blanchot again:

Dull, extinguished eyes burn suddenly with a savage gleam for a shred of bread ‘even if one is perfectly aware that death is a few minutes away’ and that there is no longer any point in nourishment.

This gleam, this brilliance does not illuminate anything living. However, with this gaze which is a last gaze, bread is given us bread. This gift, outside all reason, and at the point where all the values have been exterminated – in nihilist desolation and when all objective order has been given up – maintains life’s fragile chance by the sanctification of hunger – nothing ‘sacred’, let us understand, if something which is given without being broken or shared by him who is dying of it (‘Great is hungering’, Levinas says, recalling a Jewish saying).

But at the same time the fascination of the dying gaze, where the space of life congeals, does not leave intact the need’s demand, not even in a primitive form, for it no longer allows hunger (it no longer allows bread) to be related in any way to nourishment.

In this ultimate moment when dying is exchanged for the life of bread, not any longer, in order to satisfy a need and still less in order to make bread desirable, need – in need – also dies as simple need. And it exalts, it glorifies – by making it into something inhuman (withdrawn from all satisfaction) – the need of bread which has become an empty absolute where henceforth we can all only ever lose ourselves.

Beyond the awareness that death is close, there is the impersonal need for bread that has come too late for sustenance. Food is the parody of food. Bread appears as what it is – but only as it is no longer a content that nourishes life. It appears as what it is – but only when enjoyment has collapsed into bare existence, and need has become an empty absolute detached from any particular existence.

Here, we might remember that for Hegel, the absolute names the conceptual system contained by the phenomenal world as it develops, granting itself to human knowledge. For Blanchot, the absolute is lost in the negative absolute, which is in no way to be understood as its dialectisable correlate. The absolute, for Hegel, must be thought in its relation to the world, as well as the knowledge the human being has of this relation, but for Blanchot, hunger withdraws the ego from the relation in question and from the measure of knowledge. Ego and world – the ego and the elements – intermingle in an experience of brute existing that no longer permits of particular existents.

Great is hungering – great indeed, as it turns the ego inside out, revealing it to have been only ever a knot tied in the continuity of being. The experience Antelme describes, and that Blanchot recalls is, to be sure, exceptional. But it also indicates in what the uncertainty that inhabits enjoyment consists: the ‘concern for the morrow’ is a concern that life will become impersonal, its contents no longer more dear to it than its existing. The body, dependent in its independence, is exposed on all sides to the threat of a sensibility that no longer sustains its separation.

Great is hungering – and all the way up to the ‘there is’ in terms of which Levinas presents the empty absolute, the collapse of the world into the aperion. If the ego, as Levinas will recount, seeks to make a dwelling in the uncertainty of the element, setting up its home, it is in order to leave behind the threat of a future in which the ‘there is’ cannot be held at bay. But the home, like the digestive system, cannot maintain a simple dichotomy between inside and outside, as it allows the movement that converts the other into the same. 

Many readers of ReadySteadyBook are also readers of Stephen Mitchelmore’s peerless This Space. You will have noticed, no doubt, that an uncharacteristic quiet has settled over Steve’s blog of late. Sadly, this is because he was involved in a serious road accident on Saturday 19th January. (via)

Best wishes to Steve, whose blogging has been an inspiration to me for several years, for a full and speedy recovery. Some of Steve’s writings are archived at The Gaping Void.

The Hunger Artist: Jandek in Performance

Kafka’s hunger artist starves because he can find nothing he wants to eat. He starves and that starvation is his art – crowds come to watch him in his age, standing guard to make sure he doesn’t cheat. Of course, the music of Jandek is the result of a choice: when it comes to live performances, there’s the question of who is going to comprise the group, joining Sterling Smith (or, as he is known to concert bookers, the Representative from Corwood, that being his record label, which releases Jandek recordings) – or whether, indeed, anyone will join him at all; the length, duration and style of the songs (decided on the day of the performance, with a runthrough of the set with participating musicians, all of whom are given a considerable say in the direction of the music) and the venue itself (Corwood is very specific with its requests). And of course, with respect to the studio albums, there are choices of instrumentation, recording techniques, lyrics and so on, even as there is also a large element of improvisation in the performances. But in another sense, there seems to be no choice at all: follow the lyrics – especially those on the thematically linked albums that have appeared since the turn of the millennium, which trace, among other things, the ups and downs of a love affair, and the song-suites that have comprised some recent live performances – and it is clear, I think, that they have at their heart, a man in extremity, a man who performs because he falls short of the ordinary happiness most of us take for granted. He searches, for the most part in vain, for something to eat, but finds nothing. Nothing, that is, except perhaps performance itself, and the hope that I think is implicit to finding and addressing an audience.

Performing live, Smith’s face (the Representative’s) is almost always blank. It’s not a mask, but the absence of masks; a space onto which you can project anything at all, but only because there’s nothing to there; because, with rare lapses, it remains disarmingly still, subtracted from expression. Yet, for all that, he is an intensely physical player. We can watch him shuffle and dip as he plays his guitar – we can watch his careful enunciation of his lyrics as he leans into the microphone, stretching his words, moaning them, or letting them rise into a despondent wail, but the face, half hidden by a fedora, is without expression and his thin, ageless body is always hidden in black. We can expect no stage banter – no ‘thank you’ for applause; when his guitar string breaks onstage during his performance at Newcastle, he waits, head down and silent for three long minutes until another guitar is brought to him from backstage. Indeed, he never even glances out into the audience or acknowledges its presence. He might as well, notes the observer of a solo piano and vocal performance in Hasselt, Belgium, be playing in an empty bar.

And yet, for all that, he will sometimes reference the live situation in his lyrics. ‘I made a mistake coming here today’, he sings in London at the beginning of a solo guitar/vocal gig. And he sings, ‘I wore a scarf in Denmark/ just like I said I would’, at a performance in Aarhus, Denmark, and refers to ‘the ticket that exploded’ at a gig that was part of a festival celebrating the work of William Burroughs in Amsterdam. It works another way too – as Barry Esson, Jandek’s erstwhile promoter and MC, announced at a gig rescheduled in Brooklyn after Hurricane Katrina prevented a performance, ‘the emotion behind this event is in tribute to New Orleans’. Lyrics are written to reflect the location and the occasion of the gig, even if, at the same time, as was clear to audiences at Camber Sands and Bristol in his UK dates in late 2005, he would flip almost randomly the pages of the book he brought with him on tour (resting, at the first of these gigs, on an improvised keyboard stand and a kitchen tray) to pick out phrases to sing.

There are moments when the stage persona, for a moment, breaks – when, for example, someone calls out between songs in Chicago, in 2006, ‘Where have you been man?’, eliciting a rare, quickly suppressed smile from the Representative, or, on another occasion, he asks into his microphone, ‘is this thing on?’ But almost all accounts of seeing Jandek live emphasise the ghostly intangibility of the performer (he’s called a ‘cowboy ghost’ according to a review of the Aarhus gig), and the way the Representative seems to drift on and off the stage (even, on one occasion, emerging with his band from a trap door in the floor). The distance from his audience that Smith carefully maintains is not part of the cultivation of mystique; I think it is an attempt to honour, rather, the music itself – to preserve it in its distance and its mystery.

Even Jandek’s disparagers honour this distance, intentionally or otherwise. For all his horror at the music, Irwin Chusid‘s first response to Jandek’s debut Ready for the House, passed to him by a radio station colleague in 1980, was to wonder at the fact that someone had gone to the effort of releasing it at all. On an interview included as an extra on the Jandek on Corwood DVD, he remembers being stunned by the ‘amusicality’ of the album, by its ‘sheer emptiness’; ‘I’d never heard anything that was so naked’ – but what really mystifies him is the effort its maker had gone to to record material, get it pressed and then distributed. Why bother at all? ‘It could be worst record ever released[….] It could also be the greatest record ever released. I can’t figure it out …’, wrote Chusid to the artist in 1980. He decides, of course, in favour of the former – which fails, for him, to fall into the category of ‘so bad, it’s good’ that he celebrates in his rag-bag of a book Songs in the Key of X. It is really only the myth of Jandek – recycled, clichéd accounts of an instrumentally incompetent recluse concerned for unfathomable reasons to move some of the albums he has had pressed – that concerns him.

The lure of such a myth is undeniable. For many years, all that was known of the man behind Jandek was the record sleeves, many of which (as we can now be sure) depict Smith himself, the Representative, at various ages in a variety of situations, sometimes making use of image-altering software. For Richard Unterberger, the album cover photographs show ‘all the attention to framing and focus of the do-it-yourself stalls at Woolworth’s’ – but their artlessness is their merit, being inseparable from the recordings they sleeve. There is nothing affected about them, nothing ironical or distancing – they simply are, and uncannily so. The blank, defiant face of Six and Six matches perfectly this hard, anaesthetised recording – but if the smiling man in a cardigan in front of a country barn seems the very contrary of the despairing intoner of Worthless Recluse (an acapella recording notable for the particular extremity it reaches on some of the pieces), this doesn’t matter. Is it a holiday snap? A record of a visit to a relative in the countryside? Its incongruity seems exactly the point: an ordinary man created these songs – a man with a past like anyone else. What are we to make of Smith apparently becoming a Sufi on the covers of Raining Down Diamonds and Khartoum? Is it an oblique religious or political commentary, following 9/11 (the albums were released in 2005, but were perhaps recorded earlier …) … the sign, perhaps, that all religions are one, and that Smith is encouraging us to reach a hand to the Islamic world in fidelity and friendship? Perhaps the cover photographs mean nothing at all; perhaps they mean everything. ‘Explanations are, in fact, only a moment in the tradition of the inexplicable’, writes Agamben, ‘they are the moment, to be precise, which keeps watch over it by leaving it unexplained’.

More recently, the sleeves have not always pictured Smith – they are what appear to be holiday snaps from Cork, the Dingle penninsula in Ireland and Chester, in Northwest England, and, most recently, a series of rural scenes. What are to read into all this? Everything – since the space is blank and will admit of an infinite variety of transferences – and nothing, since it is blank and remains so. Perhaps, as Smith said to Katy Vine about his music and his relation to Jandek, ‘there’s nothing to get’; perhaps this ‘nothing’ is the correlate of the man who sings and plays at the heart of Jandek: it is Smith himself, or rather it is a hungry absence in the space of Smith, who can find nothing he wants to eat.

The outsider artist, as Chusid and Unterberger use this term, is unwitting: he does not know what makes his work interesting, but merely gets on with it; it issues from him with perfect ingenuousness. He simply does it – and it is what makes him what he is; the outsider works by instinct, perhaps in a manner more direct and naive than others, and can be admired (or mocked) for this reason. Like the man who builds a palace from tin cans in his backyard, his work would be the monument to a magnificent eccentricity; the wonder is that it exists at all. It can be admired (he does everything on his own terms), or reviled (no one else would release his music) – what matters is that dogged directness that is so naive, so simplistic, so untrained it’s significant as a phenomenon.

Perhaps this rather patronising category does capture something important about Jandek’s oeuvre – its tenacity, its seeming perversity (quote) bespeak a musical vision that can seem a simple incompetence. Yet at its best, on albums like I Threw You Away from the recent run of studio albums, or the early Chair Beside a Window, or a difficult album like Put My Dream On This Planet, this music can be said to belong to the outside only in the sense that it maintains an extremity almost unparalleled within the singer/songwriter idiom. This is what commentators like Chusid even as they disparage the music: holding itself at its distance and its reserve, it is entirely apart.

Heidegger writes that the origin of the work of art is to be considered apart from both artist and artwork. It is a spring – an Ursprung – that wells up in what he calls the working of the work of art, the way it struggles into existence. The moment of inspiration is blind in some vital sense; it belongs outside the artist. Indeed, in the philosophy of art, it was always thus – Plato fears the poet for precisely this reason: he or she may be divinely inspired, but inspiration is a form of possession or madness (see the Apology, the Ion and the Meno). In the Phaedrus, we find a more nuanced account of the dangers of lyric poetry as it glorifies the deeds of ancient times for the instruction of posterity. ‘[I]f any man comes to the gates of poetry without the madness of the Muses, persuaded that skill (techne) alone will make him a good poet, then shall he and his works of sanity with him be brough to nought by the poetry of madness, and behold, their place is nowhere to be found’. Skill, technique is not sufficient; one has to be inspired in order to be a good poet. But when inspiration is absent? The poet is a mere imitator, concerned with mimesis alone.

In the case of Jandek, technique – the received account of technique – is precisely what is wagered in the experience of inspiration. Why do musicians suppose he cannot play or sing? Because they are in thrall to a music of imitation, of tonality, of conventional song structures and playing styles. One has to listen to Jandek with another ear – or rather, listening to the music co-creates the ear of the one who listens. Here is something new; a new kind of playing, a new kind of singing, even as it borrows from established forms, even as Smith remains a kind of singer-songwriter: it is an inspired art insofar as overruns mere technical proficiency. But to listen with this new ear – to be exposed to the dangerous extremity of divine madness – isn’t this precisely the danger? Plato would have expelled all the poets from his ideal city, except for those lyric poets whose work had been appropriately purified, bearing only on the relationship between gods and human beings, performed in a standardised rhythm and mode. More admirable than those who dismiss Jandek for incompetence – for a perceived lack of instrumental and vocal prowess, or (in a more recent turn) for the apparent shortcomings in his improvisational competency – are those who are afraid for themselves in the face of such music – who meets its hunger with an unassuaged hunger of their own.

On The Ruins of Adventure (as I write, the most recent studio album) – lumbering, staggering along, this is a dazed music, a music concussed – the fretless bass accompanies aimlessly a part-sung, part-spoken vocalising marked by despondency and abyssal despair. ‘It’s toooooo bleak’ – the ‘to’ howled and stretched. ‘Embrace the greeey of reality …’ The song does not fall from the Muses, but is a thickening of the earth – a fetid swamp, or the earth moving, swarming with mosquitoes, in solifluction. Without melody or regular rhythm – without the pulse of a musical groove, it is sludgy and inert – yet it moves nonetheless; it surges forward. But what moves? What lurches lifelessly from track to track?

Heidegger calls earth that materiality foregrounded in the work of art – in this case, lumpen bass picking and a vocalising thick with despair that wanders without settling on particular pitches. This is his name, too, for the reserve that looms around us in our relation to the world (the world become useless, things as they obtrude from the purposes by which we understand them). The Ursprung of the artwork, its origin, says Heidegger, shows how earth is in perpetual struggle with the ‘world’ of intelligibility and meaning. Explanations cannot exhaust the inexplicable: perhaps there is a way of speaking of Jandek’s art that keeps watch over it by leaving it unexplained – that allows earth to resound in the torpor of his voice or the sludgy waddling of the bass. A way, then of speaking its inspired necessity as it remains outside mere technical proficiency and the imitation of existing forms.

It is Smith’s peculiar vocation to dramatise the struggle between a despair too overwhelming to permit of a beginning, of its doubling into song, and the strength, precisely to sing, to perform. Jandek remains in the neither-nor, the neutrality of this perpetually thwarted commencement. It is necessary to sing, to play – but it is just as necessary to interrupt them, to mark the performance with its own impossibility. ‘I made a mistake coming here today’ – to begin at all is a mistake; the mistake is the art, or what blossoms into art. But the flower fades straightaway; the song empties and becomes a husk. What else is performance but a sham?

The hunger artist fasts because he can find nothing to eat. Could Smith sing or play otherwise? Perhaps something changes with live performance, in which he seems to be able to take a greater distance with respect to this impossibility than previously. Manhattan Tuesday, The Afternoon of Insensitivity, which sees the Representative playing keyboards with an organ setting, accompanied by, among others, Loren Connors, constructs a sombre sound-world that is of a piece with Miles Davis’s ‘He Loved Him Madly’, not only participates in despair, performing it, trudging through it, but muses explicitly on its source in the performer’s own life. ‘It seems I’ve been depressed all my life …’

On Glasgow Monday, The Cell, Smith sings his way – wispily, breathily, in a speech-song entirely new in his work – to a kind of resolution; it seems enough to ask questions (‘What do I have?’), to let them resound. What matters is that this questioning is shared – that the audience, asked by Barry Esson to reserve their applause to the end of the song suite, shelters the inexplicable along with him. Does he find a kind of consolation thereby, a lightening of despair, when it is shared, addressed to others? I think here of the song ‘I Love You’ from Brooklyn Wednesday – does this song give despair (Smith’s, and that unleashed by Hurricane Katrina) a direction, thereby lifting it from itself, transmuting its substance? Perhaps this lightening was always present in Jandek’s music – perhaps it was there from the first, and this as why, to answer Chusid’s question, Smith went to the trouble of recording, pressing and trying to distribute 1000 copies of Ready for the House.

Listening to the small portion of the live performances that have been released by Corwood, and dreaming of releases to come, one might wonder whether the hunger artist has found something to eat. In both East and West, the ghost is often thought of as having unfinished business, whether it is a desire for revenge or for justice. Buddhist traditions call the ghost ‘hungry’ since it is still attached to the world. Has the Representative from Corwood, who looks, as so many have commented, exactly like a ghost, found something to attach him? But I think of another hunger artist – the starving novelist-to-be of Hamsun’s novel, who keeps a stone in his mouth to satiate his hunger. Driven to extremity, one day he bits down on that stone as though it were a piece of bread. And I wonder whether Jandek itself is Smith’s way to bite down on the stone he’s been turning for decades in his mouth, false succour. False, but also true, for how else to keep fidelity with the extremity in which he lives?

It was very early in the morning, the streets clean and deserted, I was on my way to the station. As I compared the tower clock with my watch I realised it was much later than I thought and that I had to hurry; the shock of this discovery made me feel uncertain of the way, I wasn’t very well acquainted with the town as yet; fortunately, there was a policeman at hand, I ran to him and breathlessly asked him the way. He smiled and said: ‘You asking me the way?’ ‘Yes,’ I said, ‘since I can’t find it myself’. ‘Give it up! Give it up!’, said he, and turned with a sudden jerk, like someone who wants to be alone with his laughter.

Kafka

I ordered my horse to be brought from the stables. The servant did not understand my orders. So I went to the stables myself, saddled my horse, and mounted. In the distance, I heard the sound of a trumpet, and I asked the servant what it meant. He knew nothing and had heard nothing. At the gate he stopped me and asked: ‘Where is the master going?’ ‘I don’t know’, I said, ‘just out of here, just out of here. Out of here, nothing else, it’s the only way I can reach my goal.’ ‘So you know your goal?’ he asked. ‘Yes’, I replied, ‘I’ve just told you. Out of here – that’s my goal’.

Kafka

Jacques Derrida, asked to narrate something of his life in an interview:

I wish that a narration were possible. For the moment it is not possible. I dream of managing one day not to recount this legacy, this past experience, this history, but at least to give a narration of it among other possible narrations. But in order to get there, I would have to undertake a kind of work, I would have to set out on an adventure that up till now I have not been capable of. To invent, to invent a language, to invent modes of anamnesis … For me, it is this adventure that interests me the most in a certain way, but which still today seems practically inaccessible.

So having said that, am I going to take the risk here, while improvising, of telling you things that would resemble a narration? No! … I don’t feel capable of giving myself over to … variations on my memory, my inheritance. All the more so in that this inheritance – if it is one – is multiple, not very homogeneous, full of all kinds of grafts.

… I see the journey of my brief existence as a journey in view of determining and naming the place from which I will have had the experience of exteriority. And the anamnesis we were talking about at the outset, this anamnesis would be in view of identifying, of naming it – not effacing the exteriority, I don’t think it can be effacted – but of naming it, identifying it, and thinking it a little better.

… a récit is not simply a memory reconstituting a past; a récit is also a promise, it is also something that makes a commitment toward the future. What I dream of is not only the narration of a past that is inaccessible to me, but a narration that would also be a future, that would determine a future.

The insufficient exposition of the beginning is what constitutes it as the place of the muses, as inspiration.

Explanations are, in fact, only a moment in the tradition of the inexplicable: they are the moment, to be more precise, which keeps watch over it by leaving it unexplained.

Giorgio Agamben

Can we find an analogue of matter in the order of thought itself? Is there a matter of thought, a nuance, a grain which makes an event for thought and unsettles it, analogously with what I have described in the sensory order? Perhaps here we have to invoke words. Perhaps words themselves, in the most secret place of thought, are its matter, its timbre, its nuance, i.e. what it cannot manage to think.

Words ‘say’ sound, touch, always ‘before’ touch, always ‘before’ thought. And they always ‘say’ something other than what thought signifies, and what it wants to signify by putting them into form.

Words want nothing. They ae the ‘un-will’, the ‘non-sense’ of thought, its mass. They are innumerable[….] They are always older than thought. They can be semiologised, philologised, just as nuances are chromatised and timbres gradualised. But like timbres and nuances, they are always being born.

Lyotard, from The Inhuman

Idiomatic: property that one cannot appropriate; it signs you without belonging to you; it only appears to the other and it never comes back to you except in flashes of madness that bring together life and death, that bring you together dead and alive at the same time. You dream, it’s unavoidable, about the invention of a language or a song that would be yours, not the attributes of a ‘self’, rather the accentuated paraph, that is, the musical signature, of your most unreadable history. I’m not talking about a style but an intersection of singularities, habitat, voices, graphims, that moves with you and your body never leaves.

In my memory, what I write resembles a dotted line drawing that would be circling around a book to be written in which I call for myself the ‘old new language’, the most archaic and the most novel, therefore unheard-of, unreadable at present. This book would be something completely other from the path that it nevertheless still resembles. In any case, an interminable anamnesis whose form is being sought: not only my history, but culture, languages, families … the accumulation of dreams, projects, or notes no doubt weighs on what is written in the present.

One day, some piece of the book may fall out like a stone that keeps the memory of the hallucinatory architecture to which it might have belonged. The stone still resonates and vibrates, it emits a painful and indecipherable bliss, one no longer knows whose and for whom …

Jacques Derrida, from an interview

Above

There are necessary writers, closer to you in some way than yourself. That you confront them in your solitude, there where only you should be. And that you cannot speak of, not ordinarily. You lack the means. How can you speak of what allows you to speak? How to separate their rhythm from your own – their style from what passes as your own (your own and what is least your own. Nietzsche knew this when he signed his work Dionysos, or the Crucified. Because to write, to speak, is to do so with a million voices.)

Style – and that is the word. Style, stylus – written across you. Within you, so that what you find in your solitude belongs outside of you. Written within the writing that you are. There, on the bookshelf – there in that author, or that one. Or in that book which you bought – when?; which was given to you … by whom? Here is Tsvetayeva: ‘It is always the same me that does not come toward the same self that is waiting for it, always’. Marina Tsvetayeva: one of the necessary writers for me.

Laughter: but you can’t read Russian. Laughter: you only have her work as it’s quoted by others. And it is her letters – scraps of letters, quoted – that you love, and not her poems. Isn’t it? Isn’t it? It is as if I want first of all the evidence of writing in a life. A writing that evidences writing, that testifies to what it has meant, to its risks, its dangers.

Tsvetayeva abandoned herself to writing, I want to write that. In some way, she abandoned herself to it. And now I remember the anecdote from quotation Mandelstam about M.T.’s rudeness … she was a tyrant, wasn’t she? She was half-mad, wasn’t she? M.T.: but when I abbreviate her name thus there’s something else I discover: that she is also more than the one Nadezhda Mandelstam met. More and other, beyond. As though, to remember the quotation again, one only meets her above, looking upward …

I do not like meetings in real life. Foreheads knocking together. Two walls. You just cannot penetrate. A meeting should be an arch. Then the meeting is above. Foreheads tilted back!

A Meeting of Styles

Tsvetayeva, the great letter writer, from her correspondence with Pasternak:

I do not like meetings in real life. Foreheads knocking together. Two walls. You just cannot penetrate. A meeting should be an arch. Then the meeting is above. Foreheads tilted back!

I have been delighted to meet many bloggers. But a meeting in writing – I think it is what I always dreamed of. A meeting of writing, and of styles, remembering what Barthes wrote:

Thus under the name of style a self-sufficient language is evolved which has its roots only in the depths of the author’s personal and secret mythology, that subnature of expression where the first coition of words and things take place, where once and for all the great verbal themes of his existence come to be installed.

An investigation of style … wasn’t that what I replied when I was asked what my contribution was to be, were I to look back on everything I had written  (not here, but elsewhere)? A stupid answer. An embarassing one. But nevertheless, the word style is enough to move me tremendously. Style … and a meeting of styles – to cite another across blogs, obviously or secretly … yes, the meeting is, as Tsvetayeva said, above

Hope

I disapprove of Cioran, and when I ask myself why, I find the answer, he is too satisfied with the forms his writing takes – with the essay, the aphorism, and perhaps with himself, too. Oversatisfied in being himself, he is not claimed, by the indecency of writing from the ‘I’, relying on the ‘I’, leaning upon it, upon what he takes to be himself, it’s as if writing – the experience of writing – never touched him. Of course, he writes,

My books, my work: the grotesquerie of such possessives. Everything was spoiled once literature stopped being anonymous. Decadence dates from the first author.

But look how he writes – in an isolated aphorism set alongside others … why do I suspect him of bad taste? Why do I think he wrote in bad taste, as if it mattered – as if my opinion mattered? He is complacent, I think to myself. He is obdurately himself, despite everything, despite writing, despite everything he’s written.

Perhaps I cannot bear him because I once admired him … I read him at that time when books formed a magic circle around me. I wanted to be protected, I think that was it. I was looking for something – what? – at the heart of the circle? I even recommended Cioran to others … I find that, too unbearable; I want to wash my hands.

Admiration for those for whom writing, the experience of writing, is itself something. For whom something is at stake, and for whom writing is hope – a ‘merciful surplus of strength’, a last strength at the bottom of weakness. And even the only hope … How melodramatic! How necessary!

This, from an old post from This Space:

There is one reason that keeps me writing: hope. The hope that I might be able to write what I need to say because it could not be said in any other way.

That said, I am not writing.

There is also the hope of reading, which is much the same: to find, at last, the narrative that allows me to breathe and to step forward actually; not vicariously through a character or the author’s experience, but actually to step forward. The metaphor is the only means.

That said, I am not reading either.

‘A Blog Goes On’

When so many blogs – 3 year projects, 5 year ones (how I dislike the word ‘project’!) have finished, I would like to remember a wonderfully unreasonable post from This Space:

Since a certain point at the weekend, I’ve been wondering what on earth I might write about here to break the silence. I feel that the silence must be broken, if only to displace the increasing desperation of the most recent entry. Also, whenever I see a blog whose latest entry is somewhat previous to the present date, I wonder: what on earth has the blogger been doing instead? From this glorious vantage point, it looks like bugger all. It looks like haughty neglect. I am offended. I take it as an affront. To what, I’m not sure.

I particularly dislike posts informing the loyal reader that the blogger is ‘taking a break’. They always announce that they’re taking a break ‘for a while’. I want to know, taking a break from what? When I write my blog, it feels like the break itself. A break like a fag break at work. Like a break gazing out of the window at the passing world. Like the breaking moments after some bad news. Like the gap between switching the TV off and getting up to go to bed. Like the time after writing. A blog goes on.

Still, I quite like the obscurity of the reason for the offence I take and the bitterness I harbour. Perhaps it makes it appear more profound; the truth is so deep and so tangled that should it ever emerge it must surely provide a revelation about this new medium; a truth glistening like a whatever emerges glistening from the unseeable depths. A big fish from a river perhaps. A screaming baby from a womb. A stream of water from a tap (such as when the sun shines through it). And, I have to say, I also quite enjoy cultivating grudges. Apart from very mild grudges against regular posters who announce that they’re ‘taking a break’ (‘for a while’), I also hold many strong grudges. Most of them are political. Many more sporting (or rather, unsporting). Some are literary. All too numerous to mention. But I’ve mentioned the latter regularly throughout this blog. They constitute this blog. Apart, that is, from the enthusiasms. Here’s an example: a review of Geoff Dyer’s new book about photography The Ongoing Moment written for the estimable Ready Steady Book.

The Creative

I set out on a journey of a thousand leagues, packing no provisions …

Why does Basho travel? To spread word of his style, his aesthetic and his own reputation – he needed disciples as a poet master. Then there is the desire to visit beautiful scenes – Mount Yoshino, Sarashina and the islands of Matsushima which had, of course, been written about by other poets. Nature and culture thus come together as one, as David Barnhill notes in his introduction to his indispensible edition of Basho’s writings which I am paraphrasing here; the Japanese have a word – utamakura – for those places that have associations with literature.

Basho – an ancient to us – also sought to bring himself into contact with the ancients. But then, more than literary, Basho’s journeys were religious, and his poetry was part of his religious life. To travel means to leave behind attachments, and to cultivate that desirelessness that is the goal of Buddhism. Wasn’t life itself a journey? And each day? After a sleepless night, Basho writes in a travel journal, as Barnhill quotes,

My distant journey remained, I was anxious about my illness, and yet this was a pilgrimage to far places, a resignation to self-abandonment and impernanence. Death might come by the roadside but that is heaven’s will.

A journey then, is a way of experiencing life in its transience, to welcome the uncertainty of fate, of heaven’s will.

Barnhill reminds us of the East Asian view of nature with great elegance.

What is natural is what exists according to its true nature. It is an ‘adverbial’ sense of natural, since it refers to a way of being. Humans are fully a part of nature: essentially we are natural. However, we have the distinctive ability to act contrary to our nature: existentially we usually live unnaturally.

Basho’s asceticism, then, the desire to cultivate and discipline himself through journeying is an attempt to rejoin nature. To create poetry is to partake of the greater creation that is nature; one must not strive to write poems, acting according to the desires of the self, but let them arise. Culture and nature are not be thought in opposition in Basho’s poetic practice. Just as the notion of utamakura joins a place of natural beauty celebrated in literary history, his poems and travel journals are both part of a long literary tradition and its reawakening in the face of a fresh encounter with the natural world.

Barnhill teaches us another word – zōka, the Creative as a term ‘for the world’s unceasing and spontaneous disposition to give rise to beautiful and skillful transformations throughout the natural world. True art is a participation in nature’s own creativity’. We should note, too, that Basho took his name (how wonderful, the idea a poet should take a name – or was he given it? was it what he received from nature’s zōka?) from the banana or plantain tree ‘precisely because it was so vulnerable to nature elements and "useless"’.

A secret: I enjoy reading of a poet’s literary philosophy as much (more than?) as reading the poems themselves (if there is such a thing: the poems themselves). Basho was a great master of haibun, haikai prose, which usually include a hokku poem, but can be considered as a form of prose poetry. Can’t commentary on poetry, on another’s poems become a similar form of poetry, partaking of the same creative act – or is it upon the Creative itself, zōka that they would both draw?

‘Hope: the following page. Do not close the book.’

‘I have turned all the pages of the book without finding hope.’

‘Perhaps hope is the book.’

Edmund Jabès (link)

We feel an affinity with a certain thinker because we agree with him; or because he shows us what we were already thinking; or because he shows us in a more articulate form what we were already thinking; or because he shows us what we were on the point of thinking; or what we would sooner or later have thought; or what we would have thought much later if we hadn’t read it now; or what we would have been likely to think but never would have thought if we hadn’t read it now; or what we would have liked to think but never would have thought if we hadn’t read it now.

Lydia Davies

As I started to write The Book of Questions, I got the impression that the culture I had relied on so far was violently cracking up. At any rate, I felt that it was no longer able to channel the anxieties I was harbouring. I no longer belonged – and foresaw that I would have to ground my writing in this not-belonging. Ragged phrases, shards of dialogues slowly surfaced – but as if from an anterior memory. Without knowing it, I was listening to a book rejecting all books and which I obviously did not master. I was interrogating this book even as I was writing it, expecting that it would create itself through the interrogation itself. But was it one book or were there innumerable books inside the book, from which its form, its ruptures, come? In a way I had to track the book beyond its ruptures, to where it has no longer any belonging or place or resemblance, where therefore it escapes all categories and traditions.

Edmund Jabès (link), translated by Pierre Joris.

The obligation to express is omnipresent in Beckett’s work[….] To my knowledge, Beckett has always refrained from speaking about the source of or the reason for this obligation.

Asja Szafraniec

[T]o begin to love life, to know birth. Including my own…. A new rule of life: to breathe without writing, from now on, to breathe beyond writing…. [W]ithout writing, without phrase, without murder…. Beyond the instinct of death, beyond the instinct of power and mastery. Writing without writing. Another writing, the other of writing, the altered writing, the one that has always traversed mine in silence.

Derrida, La Veilleuse, via.

The novel [Jabès] explains […] is the very opposite of the book. While the novelist exercises control over the writing, while he or she turns the space of the text into the space of the story to be retold, the writer of the book allows the writing to dominate. The book ‘recounts’ or, more precisely, activates not a story but the movement of writing.

The novelist masters his or her writing in order to put it at the service of the characters. By imposing on the novel a word that is manifestly exterior to the writing, the novelist assassinates the book. Ignorant of the rhythm and respiration puncturing the book’s circular and enigmatic writing, the novelist is word-deaf. He or she does not know, as does the writer of the book, how to listen to the page and to the reverberations of its whiteness and silence.

The true writer, who is not a creator but a listener, is sensitive to the book’s orality, to its freedom as uninterrupted language, to the void and silence that hide within it, to its rejection of closure, and, above all, to the invisible, forgotten, absent, always virtual book it shelters.

Richard Stamelman

Extreme fatigue goes quite as far as ecstasy, except that with fatigue you descend toward the extremities of knowledge.

It takes an enormous humility to die. The strange thing is that everyone turns out to have it.

Beware of thinkers whose minds function only when they are fueled by a quotation.

E.M. Cioran

Henry Green published his last novel, Doting, at forty seven. He drafts and redrafts a political farce, writes a couple of lacklustre stories, begins and drops a second volume of autobiography. Then he contributes a piece to The Spectator from which this is a heartbreaking excerpt:

Green can write novels, but his present difficulty is to know quite how to do it. As Time magazine says, Green is ailing, which means he has several things wrong with him which, rising sixty, is perhaps to be expected.

The same omnibus volume contains a movingly sad memoir of Green’s final years (he died at sixty-eight in 1973) by his son. There’s also a fabulous interview with Terry Southern:

Q.: Do you believe that a writer should work toward the development of a particular style?

A.: He can’t do anything else. His style is himself, and we are all of us changing every day – developing, we hope! We leave our marks behind us like a snail.

Advice on critics/ trolls from a biography of William Burroughs:

Never refute or answer the critic, thought Burroughs. Do not let the critic teach you the cloth, as they say in bullfighting circles.

Barthes on style:

… imagery, delivery, vocabulary spring from the body and the past of the writer and gradually become the very reflexes of his art. Thus under the name of style a self-sufficient language is evolved which has its roots only in the depths of the author’s personal and secret mythology, that subnature of expression where the first coition of words and things take place, where once and for all the great verbal themes of his existence come to be installed.

Whatever its sophistication, style has always something crude about it: it is a form with no clear destination, the product of a thrust, not an intention, and, as it were, a vertical and lonely dimension of thought. Its frame of reference is biological or biographical, not historical: it is the writer’s ‘thing’, his glory and his prison, it is his solitude.

Indifferent to society and transparent to it, a closed personal process, it is in no way the product of a choice or of a reflection on Literature. It is the private portion of the ritual, it rises up from the writer’s myth-laden depths and unfolds beyond his area of control. It is the decorative voice of hidden, secret flesh; it works as does Necessity, as if, in this kind of floral growth, style were no more than the outcome of a blind and stubborn metamorphosis starting from a sub-language elaborated where flesh and external reality come together. Style is properly speaking a germinative, the transmutation of a Humour.   

In ‘The Autobiographer as Torero’, Michel Leiris discusses the reasons he felt moved to write Manhood as ‘the negation of a novel’; it is not to be anything but a condensation of ‘facts and images’ in their unpolished rawness. He continues:

Already a trail had been blazed for me in this direction by André Breton’s Nadja, but I dreamed above all of making my own that project Baudelaire was inspired to undertake after reading a passage in Poe’s Marginalia: to lay bare one’s heart, to write that book about oneself in which the concern for sincerity would be carried to such lengths that, under the author’s sentences, ‘the paper would shrivel and flare at each touch of his fiery pen’.

Tim Cawkwell on Bresson from an interesting interview:

So, if you’re a monk, a medieval monk, you have to go to services seven times a day. Imagine what it’s like. You get bored. Of course you can drop out mentally but you keep going. The spiritual life – and this is true of Islam, Buddhism or Hinduism – is about the progress of the soul. Which means going through hard labour, regular practice, doing it all the time. And getting better all the time. And I think Bresson’s practice is his filmmaking. Keep working to get it right. Keep practising to get it right.

You start with Les Anges du Peche and you end up with l’Argent. It’s a continuous process, undertaken with continuous practice and through asceticism. And in religion, of course, this is what comes out. You engage in the ritual all the time and then, suddenly, a spiritual experience happens. Certain conditions arise which could only have arisen because you’ve been there, waiting for them as it were[….] It’s the moment of illumination you’ve been waiting for. Well, with religion it’s a bit like that. I go to the Eucharist each Sunday. Sometimes it’s boring and other times I get a real insight, a powerful experience. And that’s just at a very prosaic level.

I do think that, in the monastic life, or the life of the hermit, you wait for God to happen. And I think Bresson’s filmmaking is like that. He’s waiting for the special moment and that’s why, I think, he puts his actors, or models, through that automatism. What was the Montaigne quotation again?

JH – “The movements of the soul were born with same progression as those of the body.” Although Bresson later expands on this elsewhere I think, “Only… if it’s automatic.”

TC – So Bresson is waiting for the magic to happen. And maybe he’s trying to help the magic happen, or is waiting for it to happen, in each shot. I can see Claude Laydu in le Journal as Bresson’s paradigm case. He’s a wonderful find. Laydu has this wonderful quality to him, in almost every shot.

‘God gives death the dimensions of His absence.

The book veils itself in the book. As God does in God.’

and

‘A great love carries within it a mourning for love.’

Edmund Jabès (link)