W.’s Cohen, W.’s Rosenzweig, W.’s Messianism

He's about to publish his essay on Cohen and Rosenzweig, W. says on the phone. His essay on the meaning of messianism. The time has come. But where will he publish it? Somewhere as obscure as possible, W. says. Somewhere it definitely won't be read.

An obscure Polish journal has asked him for an essay, W. says. They'll translate it. That's where he'll publish it, after seven years of research. That's where his thoughts on messianism and mathematics will be archived: in a journal no one will ever read, in a language only the Poles know.

How many times has W. buried his thoughts in an obscure academic journal? How many times has his work disappeared into foreign languages no one in Britain reads? They come to him, the editors of these obscure journals, asking for something to publish. They must sniff him out. He'll do anything, if asked nicely, and by an Old European. What won't he do for a Mitteleuropean?

He hasn't really finished it, his paper, W. says. He never really understood the infinitesimal calculus, for one thing, he says, which means the long footnote he wrote on page six will never be complete. No one will know that but him, of course. No one will read the paper but him – oh, I will, of course. I might even do my best, but what could I make of it?

W.'s paper. Will he turn the world of Cohen, Rosenzweig and messianism scholarship on its head? Will he have given the world a new Cohen, a new Rosenzweig, and a new sense of messianism? Will he have transformed the scholarly field? Will he become an obligatory point of reference for the scholars who come after him?

Will papers for and against his interpretation of Cohen, Rosenzweig and messianism be presented at colloquia and conferences, and he published in academic journals? Will whole editions of journals be dedicated to his thought on Cohen, Rosenzweig and messianism, and to responding to his scholarly respondents?

Will doctoral students write these discussing the new Cohen, Rosenzweig and messianism debates with references to W.'s Cohen, W.'s Rosenzweig and W.'s messianism? Will a sense of the paradigm-busting significance of W.'s Cohen, W.'s Rosenzweig and W.'s messianism pass down into the popular imagination, into the pages of broadsheets and Radio 4 interviews?

Will the scholars of Oxford whisper of W.'s Cohen, W.'s Rosenzweig and W.'s messianism as they cross college quadrangles? Will the governing bodies of Cambridge wonder whether to offer W. a Chair ('he's not really one of us, but still …')? Will he receive offers of American lecture tours and plenary talks? Will fellow scholars stand on their chairs and cry, 'hurrah', throwing their mortar boards in the air when they hear him speak? Will a ticker-tape parade be held in W.'s hometown of Plymouth, W. being driven along and waving to cheering crowds?

It's not likely, is it?, W. says.

Chernobyl Children

It'll be like Chernobyl, our future, W. says. They'll be like Chernobyl children, our descendants, each with his deformity, each his own cancer. That's how they'll know each other, in the future – by their cancers. Everyone will have cancer, only a different kind of cancer. One will cancer of the toenail, the next cancel of the colon, a third cancer of the eyes, and so on.

And they'll die before they are teenagers, our descendants, like Chernobyl children. They'll die with no one to care for them, gasping in the boiling air. They'll die alone and trembling, thousands of them, as the atmosphere boils away.

Giant Crabs

W. imagines them like giant crabs, the destroyers of philosophy. As giant crabs with great metallic claws. But in the end, they'll only be managers. Manager-murderers, with profit and loss spreadsheets.

Someone was asked to give a definition of God: God, he said, is a sphere whose centre is everywhere and whose surface is nowhere.

Whisper, immortal muse, of the insanity of the great.

If this is philosophy it is at any rate a philosophy that is not in its right mind.

When he philosophises he usually throws a pleasant moonlight over the objects of his philosophising which is pleasing as a whole but fails to display clearly one single object.

Has the soul not got itself into a strange situation when it reads an investigation of itself – that is to say, seeks in books for what it itself might be? It is something similar to a dog that has had a bone tied to its tail – said Lion, with truth, but somewhat ignobly.

I am afraid that the excessively careful education we provide is cultivating dwarf fruit.

The French Revolution: experimental politics.

First we have to believe, and then we believe.

Is the situation so uncommon, then, in which philosophy forbids one to philosophise?

They feel the pressure of government as little as they do the pressure of the air.

Since a man can go mad I do not see why a universal system cannot do so too …

God himself sees in things only himself.

Much has been written about the first human beings: someone ought to have a go at writing about the two last.

A parable: he always wears spurs but never rides.

Let us let the grass grow over it.

We have no words for speaking of wisdom to the stupid. He who understands the wise is wise already.

When a book and a head collide and a hollow sound is heard, must it always have come from the book?

God created man in his own image, says the Bible; the philosophers do the exact opposite, they create God in theirs.

from Lichtenberg's Waste Books

Abandoned

We've been abandoned, W. says. But abandoned to what? To our lives, the wretchedness of our lives. To our failure. Again and again, our failure.

'Examine me'. - 'What is quicker than the wind?' – 'Thought'. -' What can cover the earth?' – 'Darkness'. – 'Who are more numerous, the living or the dead?' – 'The living, because the dead are no longer'. – 'Give me an example of space'. – 'My two hands as one'. – 'An example of grief'. – 'Ignorance'. – 'Of poison'. – 'Desire'. – 'An example of defeat'. – 'Victory'. – 'Which animal is the slyest?' – 'The one that man does not yet know'. – 'Which came first, day or night?' – 'Day, but it was only a day ahead'. – 'What is the cause of the world?' – 'Love'. – 'What is your opposite?' – 'Myself'. – 'What is madness?' – 'A forgotten way'. – 'And revolt? Why do men revolt?' – 'To find beauty, either in life or in death'. – 'What for each of us is inevitable?' – 'Happiness'. – 'And what is the greatest marvel?' – 'Each day, death strikes and we live as though we were immortal. This is what is the greatest marvel'.

Yudhishthira to the voice of Dharma, from Carriere's Mahabharata

KARNA: Flesh and blood rain from the sky. Bodiless voices cry in the night. Horses weep. One-legged, one-eyed monstrosities hop across the land. Birds perch on flags with fire in their beaks crying, 'Ripe! It's ripe'. A cow gives birth to an ass, a woman to a jackal. Newborn babies dance. Sons learn to be men between their mothers' thighs. Statues write with their weapons. Torches no longer give light. Cripples laugh. The different races merge. Vultures come to prayer. The setting sun is surrounded by disfigured corpses. Time will destroy the universe. I'm racked all night by my dreams. I dreamed of you, surrounded by bleeding entrails. I dreamed of Yudhisthira, radiant, mounted on a pile of bones, drinking from a golden goblet. I know from where victory will come.

From Carriere's The Mahabharata

Four Noble Truths

What has he learned?, W. muses. What are his four noble truths? He knows only that I am wrong, and that I have always been in the wrong. He's certain of that.

Not Bright Enough

He's not bright enough, that's his tragedy, W. says. That there is another dimension of thought, another dimension of life he will never attain; that the murk of his stupidity has a gleaming surface: he half understands, half knows; but he doesn't understand, he doesn't know.

But isn't that his mercy, too; isn't that what saves him? For if he understood, really understood, how immeasurably he had failed, wouldn't he have had to take his life in shame? If he knew, really knew, the extent of his shortcomings, wouldn't his blood have had to mingle with the water?

But then, if he really understood, he wouldn't be stupid, W. says.

A Concrete Block

There are some thoughts that will be forever beyond us, W. says. The thought of our own stupidity, for example; the thought of what we might have been if we weren't stupid. The thought of what he might have been, W., if he hadn't been dragged down by the concrete block of my stupidity. The thought of what I might have been, if my stupidity had simply been allowed to run its course … W. shudders.

Elephant

'The elephant in your room was your stupidity', W. says after our presentation. 'Actually, you were the elephant in the room. My God, you're fatter than ever'.

Enemy Territory

We're in enemy territory. We've been parachuted deep behind enemy lines. And what's our mission? A suicide mission, it can only be that, W. says. A soiling ourselves mission. – 'Go on, you start'.

Punctuality

If anything, I am too punctual, W. says. I'm always there before everyone, anxiously pacing about. What do I think I'm going to miss?

I know something's going to happen, W. can see that, but what? What can I possibly understand of what is going to happen?

I'm straining my intelligence, W. says. He sees it on my face. But you can't replace intelligence with punctuality.

The End

It's coming, the end, as great and fearsome as a hurricane. It's coming, the great wind that will blow out all the candles.

We want only to watch it come. Mesmerised, we want only to watch the towers fall and the cities drown.

Our Punishment

We should have enemies, terrible enemies, W. says. We deserve them. There should be satellites in low orbits, tracking our movements. There should be snipers in the bushes, ready to finish us off.

That we haven't been killed yet is a puzzling sign. Why have we been allowed to live? But perhaps that is our punishment: being permitted to live.

The Augur

W. sees me as an augur, cutting open his life in order to read the future. Cutting him open, lifting out his guts, spreading them on the table. – 'What do you see, fat boy?' What do I see, now I've eviscerated his life?

Grandly Apocalyptic

We should hang ourselves immediately, I tell W., it's the only honorable course of action. We are compromised, utterly compromised. W. feels he has to pull me back from the brink. It's not that bad, he says. We should stab ourselves in the throat, I tell him. I over-react to everything, says W., it's my dramatic nature. I'm an hysteric. He, by contrast, takes the long view. He's more grandly apocalyptic than I am. You have to see it all in terms of the apocalypse, says W. I do have my great apocalyptic moments, W. concedes, but I do not have the sobriety and longness of view required by apocalypticism.

We Love Reading …

We love reading about friendship because we know nothing whatsoever about friendship. We love reading about philosophy because we know nothing whatsoever about philosophy. We love reading about God because we know nothing whatsoever about God. We love reading about life because we know nothing whatsoever about life.

The Millenarian

I'm impatient, W. can see that. I wait for judgement like a millenarian. What have I ever wanted but the end? What, but to put an end to waiting for it, the end?

The Pelican

The mythical pelican feeds strips of its own flesh to its young, W. says. It tears strips from its own breast and feeds them to its young. And isn't that how he's fed me – by tearing strips of living substance from his breast?

Unwitting

Idiocy is always unwitting, W. says. It doesn't really know itself. It doesn't really suffer itself, that's its lightness. The idiot is an innocent, a child.

Others laugh at him, the idiot, and he laughs along. Everyone's laughing!, he thinks. Great! He even laughs at himself – but what does he understand of what he's laughing at? Everything's funny. He's an idiot – and that's funny, too. Everything's funny! Everything's hilarious.

W.'s not laughing anymore, he says. He's done with laughing. His laughter has stuck to his thoat. These are serious times, he says. When have things ever been more serious than this?

The Rosetta Stone

W. finds me strangely silent. Why have I never learned to talk?, he wonders. Why has it always been left to him, when we're in company, to speak for both of us?

For long periods, I'm mute, thinking of God knows what, W. says. I'm like some great block of stupidity. Like some great stupid Easter Island statue …

What does stupidity think about?, W. wonders. Does it ever come into an awareness of its own stupidity? Ah, but stupidity can never uncover its own truth, that's its tragedy. Stupidity can never look itself in the face.

If he has been able to speak of his stupidies, of his idiocies, that's only a sign of the incompleteness of his stupidity, of the partialness of his idiocy. But when I speak of my stupidity? I never quite grasp it, W. says. I never really reach my target.

Sometimes he likes my silence, he says. Sometimes he imagines it to be a kind of integrity- a way of guarding something, some secret. He knows something, W. says to himself, looking across at me. Or, better: something knows itself in him.

One day, they'll decrypt me, W. likes to think to himself. One day, the Rosetta Stone of my stupidity will yield up its secrets. You see!, W. will say. I told you so!, he's say, when they solve the riddle of me. But in the meantime? 

The Next Day

What will happen the next day – the day after we destroy ourselves?, W. asks. A holy silence. Birds singing. A great sigh will go up from the whole of creation. Have I ever felt, as he has, that the world is waiting for us to disappear? That the knot will be untied, the damage undone? Meanwhile, our lives. In the meantime, our friendship, which is really the destruction of friendship.

Something has gone very badly wrong, W. can't avoid that conclusion. And in some important way, it's all our fault. W. holds us responsible, he's sure not sure why. But what would I know of this? How could I understand the depths of the disaster? It's my idiocy that protects me, W. says. It burns above me like a halo.

'If you knew, if you really knew' … but I don't know, says W. I have intimations of it, to be sure. I have a sense of the disaster, but no more than that. Only he knows, W. says. Only he, of the pair of us, knows what will happen.

In my first film I started from my social sensibility and I just wanted to change the world. Then I had to understand that problems are more complicated. Now I can just say it’s quite heavy and I don’t know what is coming, but I can see something that is very close – the end.

[…] The apocalypse is a huge event. But reality is not like that. In my film, the end of the world is very silent, very weak. So the end of the world comes as I see it coming in real life – slowly and quietly. Death is always the most terrible scene, and when you watch someone dying – an animal or a human – it’s always terrible, and the most terrible thing is that it looks like nothing happened.

Bela Tarr, interviewed, back with The Turin Horse

The Same Side

Somehow I'm on the same side as the apocalypse, W. says. I'm on the same side as everything that is wrong with the world.